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The objective of this paper is to show how European Union (EU), which employs 
different varieties of capitalism, and US, which operates based on a competitive capitalist 
model,  are  coping  with  the  current  economic  crisis.  Although  EU  is  fragmented  and 
needs to work towards better and deeper integration among member states, the main 
features of the European Social Model (ESM) allows for a more sustainable recovery and 
lessens  the  social  costs.  A  new  index  was  developed  in  this  paper:  the  Synthetic 
Vulnerability  Index;  which  shows  that  the  US  position  is  worse  than  the  Eurozone 
position in terms of recovery from the current crisis and of exposure to further crises. 
Nevertheless, current financial reforms, both in the US and EU seem to be insufficient 
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1. Introduction 
The economic crisis which started in the financial sector in 2007 is still impacting 
the real economy, driving a decrease in output and employment levels.  The crisis is the 
biggest  since  the  Great  Depression  of  1929  and  several  explanations  regarding  the 
financial collapse have already been put forward (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; Krugman, 
2008;  Greenspan,  2007;  Skidelsky,  2009;  Whelan,  2010,  Semmler  et.  al,  2010;  FMI, 
2008; Bini Smaghi, 2008; Caballero et al., 2008; etc).  
The  crisis  has  caused  worldwide  losses  amounting  to  about  !3.5  trillion, 
according to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Just to give an idea, 
that is a bit less than the GDP of China or Japan, twice the GDP UK, or three times the 
GDP of India (IMF 2009a). It has driven the global recession we are currently struggling 
against, causing mass unemployment, high social costs and enormous levels of public 
debt in many countries.  
Keynesian policies and fiscal stimuli were implemented both in Europe and the 
US between 2007 and 2009. Along with these approaches, a great number of bank rescue 
packages were implemented. However, after the Greek economic crisis in May 2010, 
governmental policies shifted towards austerity measures, balanced budgets; and as a 
result, the consensus which had allowed for partial recovery, monetary liquidity, and the 
bail-out of banks and financial institutions almost dissipated. Fiscal stimuli are no longer 
unanimously accepted, and the main concerns of industrialized nations became, sovereign 
debt crises, budget sustainability, and public spending cuts.  
The objective of this paper is to show how European Union (EU), which employs 
different varieties of capitalism, and US, which operates based on a competitive capitalist 
model,  are  coping  with  the  current  economic  crisis.  Although  EU  is  fragmented  and 
needs to work towards better and deeper integration among member states, the main 
features of the European Social Model (ESM) allows for a more sustainable recovery and 
lessens  the  social  costs.  A  new  index  was  developed  in  this  paper:  the  Synthetic 
Vulnerability  Index;  which  shows  that  the  US  position  is  worse  than  the  Eurozone 
position in terms of recovery from the current crisis and of exposure to further crises. 
Nevertheless, current financial reforms, both in the US and EU seem to be insufficient 
and the recent fiscal austerity measures seem to be moving the economies in the wrong 
direction.    6 
New levels of government involvement is required in order to keep aggregate demand 
stable, make full employment possible, and create a transparent financial sector, serving 
the  real  economy  and  encouraging  productive  investments.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is 
organized as follows: session 2 introduces briefly the varieties of capitalism argument; 
session  3  describes  the  emergence  of  financialization  during  post-fordism;  session  4 
compares  the  varieties  of  financial  responses  to  the  crisis  in  US  and  EU,  session  5 
analyzes post-crisis differences and tensions between EU and US, builds the Synthetic 
Vulnerability Index and shows the return of austerity policies, and session 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Varieties of Capitalism: Economic Growth and Stability before the Financial-led 
Growth Regime 
In this session I will show that unlike today, during the Fordist period economic 
systems in advanced economies, particularly in Western Europe, enjoyed, high stability, 
accumulation, productivity, and economic growth.  The basic mechanisms of the Fordist 
model of accumulation are described in the Figure A1 of the Appendix.  
The  prevailing  model  of  development  during  the  Fordist  era  had  three 
characteristics: first, the Taylorist form of labour organization, organized around a semi-
skilled  workforce  within  a  framework  of  particular  industrial  relations;  second,  the 
regime of accumulation which allowed for a sharing of the benefits of productivity gains 
between workers and  firm owners; third, the Keynesian Welfare State, which on one 
hand  provided  unemployment  benefits,  allowing  people  excluded  from  the  Fordist 
organization to consume, and,  on the other supported a high level of aggregate demand.  
In  Europe  this  model  had  different  executions,  but  similar  results  in  term  of  GDP 
performance  and  social  outcomes.  Each  European  country  had  its  own  style  of 
development and built a model of capitalism specific to its needs (Gillingham, 2003).  
Generally  speaking,  countries  can  be  classified  according  to  their  type  of 
economic  system,  which  can  be  characterized  by  particular  institutional  forms  and 
macroeconomic factors like domestic competition, role of the state, international trade 
and openness, monetary forms, etc.  Following this approach Amoroso (2003) and Jessop 
(2002) identified 4 types of economic systems; the Anglo-Saxon model (or competitive 
capitalism), the Corporative model (Corporative capitalism), the Dirigiste model, and the   7 
Social-Democratic model.  To these models, Choi Chonj Ju, (2004) among others (i.e., 
Yeager,  2004;  Qian,  2003;  etc),  added  the  current  model  of  the  Socialist  Markets, 
represented in particular by China and Vietnam.
2  
Bruno  Amable  (2003)  narrated  a  similar  story  in  his  book  The  Diversity  of 
Modern  Capitalism;  proposing  five  different  ideal  types  of  capitalism,  taking  into 
consideration  five  institutional  forms  (product  market  competition,  wage-labor  nexus, 
financial sector, social protection, and education).  He combined the Dirigiste and the 
Corporative models (forming a Continental European model) and added two new models 
(the Asian model and the South European model).  The Amable (2003) classification is: 
(1) the Market Based economy (the US and the British economies are the closest to 
this),  (2)  Continental  European  capitalism  (lead  by  Germany  and  France),  (3)  the 
Social-Democratic  economies  (the  Scandinavian  economies),  (4)  South  European 
capitalism, and (5) Asian capitalism.  
The  table  below  summarizes  the  main  characteristics  of  these  socio-economic 
models, and, in parentheses, lists the notable adherents to the model.  The table combines 
the work of the authors cited above. 
For our purposes we will consider the European Social Model as a combination of 
the  German,  French,  and  Scandinavian  models.
3    These  three  models  have  much  in 
common and share similar features, particularly within the financial sector (Sapir, 2005).  
In general terms, the Eurozone is the aggregation of European countries which fit, to 
some extent, into the ESM.
4 The UK and Ireland, although EU members, are considered 
part  of  the  Competitive  Capitalism  Model  (known  also  as  Anglo-Saxon  model  or 
Competitive Market Economies).  
                                                 
2 China and Vietnam represent “Socialist Markets” and seem to be the only two countries which embrace 
such a model.  This represents an evolution and is the result of a reform process which started first in China 
in 1978 and intensified during the 1990s (Yeager, 2004).  This process transitioned China and Vietnam 
from planned economies to “Socialist Market” economies, characterized by forms of property rights which 
allow:  1)  both  private  and  government  investment,  without  complete  liberalization,  privatization  and 
political pluralism; 2) integration (though modest) into the world economy; and, 3) government control and 
monitoring of domestic financial markets. 
3 This is more in tune the work of Pontusson (2005), and Soskice and Hall (2001). 
4  Distinct  varieties  of  capitalism  exist  within  the  EU  and  Eurozone.  The  correspondence  between  the 
Eurozone and the ESM may be not perfect, but it is a generalization that we need to use in order to compare 
the ESM to the US.  My argument – that considers the ESM superior to the US model - would be even 
stronger if I were to only consider the European countries which fit into the ESM, i.e. Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
plus Norway and Switzerland (these last two are not actually EU members).  For a detailed classification of 
the varieties of capitalism with EU member states, see Table A1 in the Appendix.   8 
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Note: Source: Adaptated from the classifications of Jessop (2002), Amoroso (2003), Amable (2003), and 
Choi Chonj Ju (2004).   
The ESM ensured better economic performance in Europe during the Fordist era 
of accumulation with respect to US. It was able to deliver better GDP performance for a 
extended period of time, at least until the end of the 1970s (see figure A2 in appendix). 
After that, the process of financialization began and a finance-led growth regime took 
over; the old Fordist regime went into crisis. Reasons for that are different as explained 
by many scholars (Lipietz 1992; Jessop 2002; Boyer and Saillard 2002)
5. Under this 
model of development the EU, or more accurately the Eurozone, was able to outpace the 
US  in  social  and  economic  benchmarking  areas  such  as  inequality,  poverty,  public 
education, and life expectancy thanks to a large public program of social expenditures (as 
Table A1 and Figure A3 in the Appendix display) . The US, on the contrary, saw slightly 
faster GDP growth since the 1980s in comparison to the EU, in particular during the past 
two  decades  of  financialization,  but  a  concerning  drop  of  important  social  indicators 
                                                 
5 In brief, the causes of the Fordist crisis are: a decrease in productivity, poor labor organization, the 
internationalization of problems through pressure on labor costs, and the resulting decrease in the demand. 
These  are  supply  side  causes,  national  and  international  ones,  and  exogenous  to  the  core  of  Fordist 
economic doctrine.  
   9 
(inequality and poverty). In my opinion, there are at least two reasons that this does not 
identify a trade-off between efficiency and equality. First, the EU was also growing over 
the past twenty years (albeit at lower rates than the US economy), not simply maintaining 
their social indicators. Second, the current financial crisis affected the US very badly in 
particular, putting into doubt the US model and its vaunted efficiency (Posner, 2009; 
Wolff, 2009). For these reasons I argue that the ESM is not only able to produce better 
social performance but also more efficient and sustainable economic development in the 
long run than the US model. 
 
3. Financialization during Post-Fordism 
After the demise of Fordism, an unstable new regime of accumulation emerged 
(Jessop  2002;  Boyer  and  Saillard,  2002).  It  is  characterized  by  high  market 
financialization,  a  so-called  flexible  accumulation  regime,  and  markedly  uneven 
development, with micro-electric, internet, advanced technology, the Knowledge Based 
Economy driving further cycles of accumulation (Peck and Tickell, 2003; Jessop, 2002). 
Wages after the 1970s in advanced economies and particularly in US almost stagnated, 
and profits soared dramatically (Wolff, 2009; EuroMemorandum, 2010). Simultaneously 
inequality increased sharply (OECD, 2010). In order to keep consumption up, the US 
maneuvered economic policies: used cheap money which allowed bubbles in the housing 
sector and private debt soaring; and allowed huge amount of cheap imports from China. 
This eventually ended up with  huge Current Account (CA) deficit: at the eve of the 
financial crisis in 2007 the US CA deficit was 700 US bn $ (5% of US GDP), of which, 
80% depends on Chinese exports (IMF 2009b). US financed the CA debt issuing US 
bonds which were bought in turn by Chinese. The issue of global imbalances emerged 
strongly and it is seen as a co-determinant of the current economic crisis (Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 2009).  
The shape of regulation during post-fordism changed dramatically to allow for 
financialization (Lipietz 1992). As Petit (2003: 20) pointed out, with the transition to 
post-Fordism,  institutions  are  evolving  and,  in  particular,  the  institutional  forms  of 
competition tend to prevail in the emerging regime. On this argument, Boyer (2005) says 
that in the “hierarchy of the institutional forms,” the one leading the way in the advanced 
economies during the transition period seems to be the finance sector (2005: 4), which 10
shapes all other institutions (2005: 18).
6 The figure below shows, through the value of 
market capitalization in the stock exchange, as a percentage of GDP, the consistency of 
the process of financialization in the past two decades
7.   
Figure 1 – Financialization since 1988 
 
Source: World Bank, 2010, Statistical Indicators (online database)
Moreover, at the political level, the transition to post-Fordism seems to be assisted 
by a neo-conservatism ruling class.  Hence, a comparison with the previous pre-1920s 
Fordist era seems legitimate, when the liberist model of development was based on an 
extensive accumulation regime (Aglietta, 1979) with a pressure on labor costs, without 
government playing a significant role in the economy, without a productivity sharing 
compromise, and without the Keynesian Welfare State (Basso, 1998). Such a process of 
finacialization was coupled with both an increase of inequality and a decline in the wage 
shares over the GDP, as the figure below shows. 
                                                
6 However, both, Petit (2003) and Boyer (2005) agree that in the Fordist era, the wage relation was the 
dominant institutional form and that is what made consistent economic growth possible. 
7 Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's 
stock exchanges at the end of the year.  Listed companies do not include investment companies, mutual 
funds, or other collective investment vehicles. 11
Figure 2 - Wage shares on GDP, selected countries 
 
Source: Euromemorandum 2010 
Transition  to  post-Fordist  financial-led  regimes  is  identified  in  the  US  with 
Reaganomics  and  in  the  UK  with  Thatcherism.  Jessop  (2002)  argues  that  new 
accumulation strategies emerged during that period.  They involved multinational power, 
international  financial  discipline,  a  more  authoritarian  state,  and  a  sort  of  popular 
capitalism.  The previous Fordist strategy was replaced by an internationally-oriented and 
financially aggressive strategy, deregulated and concentrated dually on Wall Street and in 
the  City  of  London.  Reaganomics  and  Thatcherism  were  strategies  that  aimed  to 
restructure the accumulation system through a new regulation system (Peck and Tickell, 
1992), at the expense of the social compromise realized after the second World War.  The 
result  was uneven development  (Peck  and  Tickell, 1992),  with  regions  and  countries 
divided between financial services and technology-oriented ones, and increasing trends in 
inequalities and income disparities, in particular in the US and the UK, the countries 
which were more keen towards financialization, as the figure below shows. 12
Figure 3 - Wage dispersion, selected countries  
 
Source: Euromemorandum 2010 
A similar transition towards post-Fordism, although less severe than in the US 
and UK, is exhibited by other continental European countries, such as West Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain (Jessop, 2002), where severe fiscal and monetary policies, along 
with industrial restructuring, generated precarious jobs, and higher inequality in particular 
since the 1990s (Fitoussi, 1992).  
These are the roots of the current financial-led model of accumulation and they 
put in place the mechanisms which helped spur the current crisis. In particular, when the 
wage-nexus  is  compressed  and  labor  became  extremely  flexible,  the  investment 
dimension  is  neglected  and  replaced  by  speculative  financial  investments  driven  by 
shareholders interests, and consumption needs to be sustained by fragile financialization 
and risky financial tools.  Failures of the financial-led model of accumulation are evident 
today because of the crisis, but can be traced to the relatively poor performance of most 
of the advanced economies during the post-Fordist era, in terms of productivity and GDP 
growth (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Petit (2009) refers to the period between 1997 
and 2007 as a lost decade of financialized capitalism in terms of productivity gains and 
growth.  Liberalization of finance and globalization did not bring more innovation, since 
new investments, in which technological progress is usually embedded, lacked substance.    13 
4. Varieties of Responses to the Financial Crisis in the US and EU  
The economic crisis of 2007-09 produced painful outcomes in the labor market 
and  society  in  general,  both  in  the  US  and  in  Europe.  In  short,  it  caused  a  global 
recession, mass unemployment, high social costs, and enormous public debts in many 
countries (see Figure A4 and Table A3 in the Appendix). In this paragraph I will analyze 
the responses to the crisis put forward by the US and EU. The US made its response in 
line with its Competitive Market Economy (CME) model, the EU within the framework 
of a traditional European Social Model. The latter, however, tends to represent more 
specifically a Eurozone model (with the exception of Ireland), rather than an EU model 
since the UK position
8 more often resembles US regulation.  
In  general,  regarding  the  financial  overhaul,  the  EU  (except  UK  and  Ireland) 
relies  more  on  the  existing  institutional  governance  structures  of  non-market 
coordination, while the US, UK, and Ireland rely more on the presumed efficiency of 
financial markets. It is very interesting to see how, at the April 2009 G20 meeting in 
London, the different types of socio-economic models and their strategies for recovery 
were  clearly  divided:  the  Franco-Allemande  axe,  supported  by  Sarkozy  and  Merkel, 
called for all-encompassing state regulation and financial restrictions on hedge-funds and 
tax havens. The Anglo-Saxon strategy, backed by Brown and Obama, aimed mostly at 
reaching a consensus in order to provide monetary liquidity to the financial system.  
The G20 summit, since its first meeting in Washington, DC in November of 2008, 
has created conditions to change the global financial structures.  However, progress has 
thus far been made only at very superficial levels, such as tax haven limitations and 
calling for limitations on executive compensation. An interesting step towards a more 
democratic  and  global  system  of  financial  governance  seems  to  be  the  creation  of  a 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) which should enhance coordination and improve macro 
and micro prudential supervision.
9 The FSB was established to address vulnerabilities 
and to develop and implement strong regulatory, supervisory, and other policies in the 
                                                 
8 For a detailed overview on the British position, see Turner Review ( 2009) a UK regulatory Report named 
after  Lord  Turner,  chairman  of  the  United  Kingdom’s  Financial  Services  Authority,  who  chaired  the 
review’s research group.  
9 The FSB was established after the 2009 G20 summit in London as a successor to the Financial Stability 
Forum.  The latter was founded by G7 countries in 1999 to promote international financial stability, but has 
had little impact.  The FSB is based in Basel, Switzerland.  The chairman of the board is Mario Draghi, 
president of BankItalia.   14 
interest of financial stability. It includes all G20 major economies, the IMF, WB, the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and the European Commission.  The Secretary 
of the US Treasury Tim Geithner has described it as a fourth pillar in the architecture of 
global economic governance, along with IMF, World Bank, and WTO.  
That  said,  within  the  EU  many  of  differences  exist.    These  differences  can  be 
classified in the following ways: 
1.  Differences between Eurozone and Non-Eurozone nations; 
2.  Differences  between  Member  States  and  the  central  position  of  the  EU 
Commission; 
3.  And,  above  all,  differences  between  the  Eurozone  (Germany  and  France  in 
particular) and UK. 
Tension and contradiction exists within EU in general, and this is affecting the final 
outcomes  of  financial  regulation.    Compromises,  carve-outs,  and  generic  language 
weaken the new EU regulation (Wahl 2010). 
 
4.1. US Regulation (the “Frank-Dodd Act”) 
   In July 2010 a financial reform package was adopted in the US, despite the strong 
opposition of Republicans and Wall Street lobbies.
10  A lot of compromises and carve-
outs weakened the original proposal of the White House and Secretary of Treasury Tim 
Geithner. The important elements of the US reforms can be synthesized into the 
following 10 points: 
1.  New requirement for higher capital and liquidity standards for corporations and 
banks. 
2.  The famous “Volcker Rule,” which eliminates the dangerous coexistence between 
investment and commercial banks. 
3.  Under the Volcker Rule, banks are limited in engaging in proprietary trading. 
4.  Banks must hold enough capital in reserve to reflect their off-balance sheet, cope 
with crisis, and avoid illiquidity. 
                                                 
10 “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” was named after the chairmen of 
the two congressional committees dealing with banking, was signed into law by President Obama on 21 
July 2010.   15 
5.  A new insolvency regime is introduced, not only for firms but also for banks, and 
it gives more regulatory and supervisory power to the Treasury. 
6.  Trade in derivatives is strictly regulated and centralized within a third party 
clearing authority.  
7.  Financial firms and hedge funds managers are required to submit swaps to a third 
authority to back their operations. 
8.  A new supervision was introduced for Credit Rating Agencies (CRA).  The 
supervisor has the right to examine rating agency operations, data, and 
methodologies. They can be eliminated from a CRA book if they are shown to 
have been providing bad ratings for long time, and, most importantly, they are 
prohibited from advising an issuer and rating that issuer’s securities in order to 
reduce/eliminate conflict of interests.  
9.  US households and consumers, as well as investors, are better protected under the 
new laws, with a special agency (Consumer Financial Protection Agency); 
10. Stronger supervision and oversight from the Fed, with the creation of a Financial 
Stability Oversight Council that monitors Wall Street’s largest firms and financial 
institutions. 
After the US Frank-Dodd Act, a new supervisory architecture system will be in place, 
with a major role for the Fed and a stronger advisory role for the Treasury.  A Council of 
Regulators  is  set  up  to  coordinate  supervision  with  the  Fed.  The  Fed  wields  more 
prudential supervision over large firms and has an oversight role to play along with other 
US authorities.  This supervision and oversight can be summarized at macro and micro 
levels. 
 
At the Micro Level:  Prudential Supervision in US  
Banks are now required to hold more capital and liquidity than before.  Large 
hedge funds have to register with the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)
11 and 
                                                 
11 A government commission created in 1934 by Congress to regulate the securities markets and protect 
investors.  In addition to regulation and protection, it now also monitors corporate takeovers in the U.S.  
The SEC is composed of five commissioners appointed by the U.S. President and approved by the Senate.  
The statutes administered by the SEC are designed to promote full public disclosure and to protect the 
investing public against fraudulent and manipulative practices in the securities markets.  Generally, most 
issues of securities offered in interstate commerce, through the mail or on the internet must be registered 
with the SEC.   16 
are regulated by it.  Under the Volcker Rule, although this was curtailed by Senate with 
respect to the initial Obama proposal, proprietary trading is limited.  This refers to trading 
stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, their derivatives, or other financial instruments 
with the bank’s own capital, rather than that of its customers.  In general, proprietary 
trading is considered to be riskier and is associated with more volatile profits (Conzelman 
et  al.,  2010:  4).    Moreover,  the  Volcker  Rule  introduces  the  separation  between 
commercial and investment banks.
12  Banks are also required not to bet against their own 
clients.  Commercial banks can no longer make speculative bets for their own profits.  
Banks will be allowed to invest in private equity and hedge funds, but at a level limited to 
3% of their capital!""At the same time, a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency, 
housed in the Fed, was set up to provide consumers with services related to mortgage 
brokers, debt collectors and credit counsellors.  New federal banking regulators have 
been created, also. At the top of this regulatory and supervision hierarchy sits the Fed, 
which monitors commercial banks and large firms while the SEC monitors the securities 
market  and  the  Commodity  Futures  Trading  Commission  (CFTC)  monitors  futures.  
Insurance is monitored at the state level 
 
At the Macro Level:  Prudential Supervision in the US 
The Fed is empowered as a systemic regulator in its role of market vigilance and 
monitoring financial institutions at macro level.  The new Council of Regulators chaired 
by the Secretary of Treasury advises the Fed on systemic risks.  It has been created as a 
new  insolvency  regime  for  bank  and  non-bank  firm  bankruptcies,  with  special  and 
extended powers of the Treasury.  The new financial architecture was reinforced by the 
introduction of the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council, which should 
reduce  the  deficit  in  the  US  for  financial  institutions  and  large  firms  in  particular 
(Conzelman et al., 2010), thanks in part to the new role of the Fed.  The Fed will lead the 
oversight of large financial institutions whose failures could threaten the financial system.  
At the same time, the Fed’s relationship with banks is controlled directly by the US 
Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO can audit: 1) 
                                                 
12 The coexistence was introduced by Clinton, who repealed the Glass-Steagal Act which had ensured the 
complete separation between commercial banks, which accept deposits, and investment banks, which invest 
and take risk, prompting the era of super bank and primed the subprime pump.  In 1998 sub-prime loans 
were just 5% of all mortgage lending.  In 2008 they were about 30%.   17 
emergency loans made by the Fed (including the ones made after the 2007 financial 
crisis); 2) the Fed’s low-cost loans to banks; and, 3) the Fed’s buying and selling of 
securities to implement interest-rate policy (Conzelman et al., 2010). 
 
4.2. EU Regulation and Responses 
The immediate EU responses to the crisis managed by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) were delayed in comparison to the Fed’s reaction, which put immediately huge 
monetary liquidity back into in the system and lowered the interest rates (from 5.25% to 
2% in 2008 and to 0.25% in 2010).  The ECB did the same, but in a more passive way 
and with some delay (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Moreover, monetary quantitative 
easy  was  less  consistent  and  the  interest  rate  was  lowered  at  a  slower  paces.
13  By 
contrast, the inadequate response of the ECB was followed by a stronger EU regulatory 
approach to the crisis. This was mainly the result of the recommendations made by the 
De  Larosière  Report  (2009)
14,  which  were  adopted  by  following  EU  directives  and 
regulations,  and  by  a  declaration  of  support  from  the  EU  Commission  (2009),  the 
European  Council  (2009),  and  the  ECOFIN  meeting  on  June  9,  2009.    However,  as  we 
mentioned above, the EU regulation is weakened by the fragmentation among the EU 
member states and their different national regulations of financial markets. 
 
At the Micro Level: Prudential Supervision in the EU 
   The  new  EU  regulations  for  financial  supervision  of  banks,  insurance,  and 
securities  created  the  European  System  of  Financial  Supervisors  (ESFS),  with  3 
functional authorities and regulatory powers over banks, insurance, and securities: the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
(EIOP), and the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA).
15  This is a compromise 
between the UK and the EU commission, plus the France-Germany position.  The former 
                                                 
13 Surprisingly enough on July 2008, two month before the collapse of Lehmann, the ECB increased its 
interest rate to the high level of 4,5%, even though the crisis had already reached European banks (British 
Institute Northern Rocks was nationalized in February of 2008, and the German IKB went to bankrupt in 
July of 2007).  Since the end of 2008, the interest rate was lowered to 2.5% and then to 1%, although still 
above the rate of 0.25% set by the Fed.  
14 The De Larosière Report, published in February 2009, is the result of the research of the High-Level 
group chaired by Jacques Larosière, commissioned by the European Commission.  
15 See EU (2009b).   18 
did not want to give the EU strong supervisory power.  The latter pushed for a stronger 
role for EU in the financial supervision.  The result is a system of oversight which, at the 
operational level, remains the responsibility of nations.  The role of the EBA, EIOP, and 
ESMA is to promote cooperation, financial harmony, a common culture of supervision, 
and common technical standards for monitoring and control
16.  
The harshest legislation the EU is introducing concerns OTC derivatives (EU, 
2010a),  securitizations  such  as  Credit  Default  Swaps
17  and  all  kind  of  Alternative 
Investment  Funds  (AIF)  like  hedge  funds,  private  equity  funds,  real  estate  funds, 
commodity funds, and infrastructure funds (EU, 2009c).  The EU has realized that there 
is much speculative activity among those funds which need to be regulated.  The biggest 
hedge fund was a fraud (Madoff’s fund)
18, and many AIF activities rely on opaque Ponzi 
schemes.  Most OTC derivatives operate wildly in off-shore financial havens across the 
world,  avoiding  regulation  protections  for  investors,  as  EU  Commissioner  Barnier 
reported
19.    Only  10%  of  derivatives  traded  are  standardized  and  traded  on  a  Stock 
Exchange,; the remaining 90% are traded Over the Counter (OTC), i.e. bilaterally and 
without control or supervision.  At the end of 2009, the volume of OCT trade was around 
$614 trillion (ten times global GDP of the world) (BIS 2010).  
 
At the Macro Level: Prudential Supervision in the EU 
The newly created European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will be at the center of 
the new system in the EU, although only with advisory functions
20 (see Figure A5 in the 
                                                 
16  The  opposition  to  the  EU  finance  regulation  of  the  UK  Parliament’s  Treasury  Committee  was 
immediately clear, and in an internal paper it suggested to the UK government to use their veto in the EU 
Council against it if the initial EU text would not be modified (UK Treasury Committee 2010:5).  
17 They are a kind of insurance against credit default, but turned out to be speculative tools on the large 
scale, thanks to the mistaken evaluation of the CRA (2009a).  During the financial crisis, the link between 
the initial credit and its securities derivatives was lost.  Creditors could take more risks, because through 
CDS they could transfer the risk to somebody else.  In the end, nobody knew how many CDS existed and 
where they were held.  CDS were used massively to speculate against the Euro in the Greek crisis (Wahl, 
2010). 
18Investors in Madoff’s funds lost $60 billion.  In 2009, he was sentenced to 150 years in prison for 
defrauding investors through a massive Ponzi scheme. 
19 EU Observer, 16.09.2010. http://euobserver.com/19/30821. 
20 The Steering Committee of the ESRB is composed of the seven European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB)  members  (including  the  President  of  the  ECB),  the  three  chairs  of  the  European  Supervisory 
Authorities,  a  member  of  the  EU  Commission,  and  the  President  of  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Committee.    The  General  Board  of  ESRB  comprises  apart  from  the  Steering  Committee  members  all 
central bank governors of the EU 27.   19 
Appendix).  European Central Banks play a major role within this Board, helping to 
define,  identify  and  prioritize  all  macro-financial  risks.  Macro-financial  stability  may 
need to be pursued through different means than the ECB’s price stability objectives 
Smaghi (2009).  This is a possible area of tension between the two institutions, and that is 
why the ECB, which prioritizes price stability, wants to maintain the leading role.
21  The 
ESRB deals essentially with macro prudential supervision and reports to ECOFIN.  It is 
also  allowed  to  make  warnings  and  recommendations  directly  to  EU  national 
governments.  
 
5. Tensions, Vulnerabilities and Austerities among the US and EU 
The  regulatory  overhauls  passed  after  the  crisis,  both  in  the  US  and  EU  are 
different. The differences are just consequences of different perspectives on the crisis, 
which in turn underlines the different models in which the crisis simultaneously occurred: 
the ESM and the CME. These differences will likely bring about a new phase of post-
financial crisis relations between the US and EU.  In fact, the post financial crisis phase 
brought  about  both  new  and  old  disagreements  between  the  EU  and  US.  These 
disagreements reflect the basic differences between the economic systems of the EU and 
US.  Varieties of capitalism and the different styles of market economy are issues which 
have already been explored in literature, as I mentioned earlier. This affects national 
problem solving and global answers to the crisis. Institutions are put in place by countries 
according to each one’s own model of capitalism. Hence, finance and financial regulation 
is an institutional form which reflects a nation’s individual economic model. 
 
5.1 Tensions and differences between EU and US  
                                                 
21 The primary objective of the ESB is to maintain price stability.  This is different from the mandate of the 
US central bank, as stated in its Statute: “Fed shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote 
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”  For 
the ECB instead, the goal of economic growth secondary to inflation: “Without prejudice to the objective of 
price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.” 
(Article 2 of ECB Statute). 
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The  most  important  disagreement,  both  within  the  EU  and  on  a  global  level, 
concerns a financial transaction tax (FTT).  This is an old issue: the first to advance a 
proposal  for  a  financial  activity  tax  was  James  Tobin  (1978).    Now  the  issue  has  a 
twofold significance.  First of all, the FTT would serve to finance the huge costs of this 
crisis.  Since the financial sector bears much of the responsibility for this crisis, it is only 
fair, the advocates of the FTT say, that it pays for the societal costs.  The expenditures of 
governments on stimulus programs to counter the crisis in the real economy was around 
3.5% of global GDP.  Along with the government money that went to rescuing banks, the 
total cost is !3.5 trillion at the global level (IMF, 2009a). Secondly, as in the original 
opinion of Tobin, it would regulate financial markets, limit speculation, and reduce short 
term and electronic financial activities, which have little to do with investment and saving 
operations.    The  FTT  is  discussed  mostly  in  the  EU,  in  particular  among  Eurozone 
nations, with Germany and France the principal supporters.  The UK, US, and Canada 
strongly object it and the G20 Pittsburg meeting has already rejected it.  Bank lobbies are 
strongly against the FTT, too. The Obama administration sees a potential compromise in 
a sort of Bank Levy, which would have a more modest impact on tax collection ($14-19 
billion in estimated revenues, against $738 billion in revenues from the FTT)
22. However, 
in the US many Congress members, in particular after the mid-term election of November 
2010  was  won  by  the  Republicans,  are  strongly  against  a  Bank  Levy  as  well.    An 
interesting  proposal comes  from  the IMF,  the Financial Activities Tax  (FAT),  which 
would tax the profits and remunerations of banks only (IMF, 2009a). 
A  controversial  issue  remains  over  the  Basel  agreements.    On  the  eve  of  the 
financial crisis, the EU had just adopted (in 2006) Basel II, a set of rules regulating the  
capital  requirements  of  banks,  which  were  very  flexible  and  favorable  so  that  banks 
would agree to them.  The new Basel agreement reached after the crisis (Basel III), in 
September  of  2010,  increases  banks  capital  requirements,  limits  their  liabilities  and 
leverage  ratios,  and  requires  higher  liquidity  standards  to  meet  customers’  needs.  
Moreover, banks are required to fulfil the primary role in the game of securitization; 
holding higher shares of the securities in the credit risk products.  Most importantly, a 
new definition of “capital” is introduced, according to which equity capital and disclosed 
                                                 
22 The estimate is done with a FTT at 0.1% and a medium reduction of the transaction volume per year 
(Schulmeister et al., 2008).     21 
reserves  only  (i.e.  liquid  and  own  bank  assets)  are  considered  (see  Table  A4  in  the 
Appendix).  This  improves  the  quality  and  consistency  of  capital  and  of  leverage.  
However, while the EU will immediately adopt Basel III as it is suggested in an EU 
Parliament Proposal of 2010 (EU, 2010b), the US and UK are still devoted to a more 
flexible definition of capital and continue to refer to Basel II for guidance on most capital 
requirements. Moreover, the EU (with the exception of the UK) would support even 
higher standards, with capital requirements set at or near 10%.  
Finally, another controversial issue is over Alternative Investments Funds (AIF).  
The EU recognizes that risks associated with AIF have been underestimated and are not 
sufficiently addressed by current rules.  Many activities of large AIF, particularly those 
employing  high  levels  of  leverage,  have  greatly  contributed  to  the  current  financial 
instability of the UE. Toxic assets related to AIF were implicated in the commodity price 
bubbles that developed in late 2007.
23 The new legislation tries to regulate not only AIF, 
but  most  importantly,  AIF  managers  (AIFM)  whose  activities  in  their  off-shore 
headquarters, on behalf of AIM, often avoid regulation.  The new EU regulation on these 
matters is a good step forward (Wahn, 2010).  However, the issue of AIF regulation in 
the EU is very complicated, in particular because of the UK opposition, in line with US 
position, which prefers to keep looser regulations and protect British interests: at the 
London stock exchange, 80% of all Hedge funds in the world operate, and the AIF’s 
lobby is very strong.  They do not like the idea of stricter supervision, disclosure of 
strategies, leverage limits, higher costs, or lower risks, which mean lower profits.  Since 
the  operational  supervisors  of  the  new  authorities  created  by  the  EU  remain  at  the 
national level, implementation can be difficult.  Another issue of discordance within the 
EU, in particular between Germany and the UK, is the case of Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS).  New EU regulations impose stricter supervision and introduce the right to ban 
short selling and the trade of CDS temporarily when it realizes that there is a speculation.  
Uncovered,  or  “naked,”  short  selling  is  banned  (European  Council  (2010).    Such 
measures would have limited the severity of the Greek crisis in the spring 2010.  The 
                                                 
23 In its proposal, the EU acknowledges that AIF are covered by a lack of transparency when building 
stakes in listed companies, conflicts of interest, and failures in fund governance, in particular with respect 
to remuneration, valuation and administration, market abuse, misalignment of incentives in management of 
portfolio companies, weakness in internal risk management, inadequate investor disclosures, pro-cyclical 
impact  of  herding  and  risk  concentrations,  and  direct  exposure  of  systemically  important  banks  (EU 
2009c).    22 
ESMA is the newly elected vigilance institution for that. Furthermore, requirements of 
transparency and information are required at the Stock Exchange where CDS are traded, 
and individual traders have to disclose their short positions over these assets.
24  
 
5.2 The Synthetic Vulnerability Index  
These  disagreements  are  crucial  to  the  definition  of  new  global  financial 
governance, and show how deep the differences between the EU and the US and UK (and 
Anglo-Saxon  countries  in  general)  (Semmler  and  Young,  2010).  Beyond  these 
differences,  and  despite  the  attempts  to  reform  the  financial  sector,  finance  and  the 
economy  at  large  still  remain  vulnerable,  both  in  the  EU  and  US.  This  is  due  to  a 
combination of four indicators which are currently in dangerously vulnerable positions: 
1) government deficits, 2) unemployment, 3) Current Account deficits (CA), and 4) slow 
recovery.  The  average  of  these  four  variables  was  calculated  with  the  Synthetic 
Vulnerability Index (SVI)
25 in the figure below, for the Eurozone and US.  From the SVI, 
the position of the US appears to be consistently weaker than that of the Eurozone (and in 
2010 is -4.8 against -3.975) due in particular to higher government deficits and negative 
CA balance. Similarly in 2011. Moreover, the bilateral position of the EU-US, in terms of 
import-export merchandise and CA, shows a better position for the EU, in a constant 










                                                 
24 The German regulation is even stricter on short selling because it bans speculation on falling prices, not 
only temporarily and in case of threats to stability.  The German position is heavily criticized by the UK, 
which would prefer limited bans, or none at all. 
25  The  SVI  is  simply  the  arithmetic  average  of  those  4  variables.  The  lower  the  worse.  As  regards 
Unemployment, which has normally a positive value, it was considered with the opposite sign in order to 
be consistent with the other variables. 23
Figure 4 - US Synthetic Vulnerability Index 
 
Source: own elaboration on IMF, 2010 World Economic Outlook (online database) 
Figure 4 – EU Synthetic Vulnerability Index
 
Source: own elaboration on IMF, 2010 World Economic Outlook (online database)   24 
Beside that, another indicator supports the idea that the US is more vulnerable 
than the Eurozone, and in particular indicates that the US faces higher social costs.  That 
is the recent evolution of the labor market indicators of employment and unemployment.  
Despite a lower recession in the US as compared to the Eurozone (-2.6% against -4.1%), 
in the US, the labour market was seriously affected by an unemployment rate which went 
from 4.6% to 9.8% (+5.2) and employment rate which fell from 72% to 64.5% (-7.5) in 
2010 (see Figure A8 in the Appendix). The corresponding figures for the Eurozone look 
much  better,  with  the  unemployment  rate  rising  from  8.6%  to  9.6%  (+1.2)  and 
employment rate falling from 66.2% to 65.7% (-0.5%) (see Figure A9 in the Appendix) 
Obviously the role of Trade Unions, traditionally stronger in Europe (Nickell, 1997), has 
been crucial in protecting employment during the recession; beside, the unemployment 
elasticity to GDP changes seem to be much lower in the EU than in the US. Moreover, 
the GDP changes (and recovery) in the US seem to be seriously affected by structural 
problems which shape negatively income distribution and favors mostly the financial 
sector, which are continuously compensated with short-term finance bonus biases (which 
do not find any theoretical justification). Wage shares on GDP continue to decline during 
the crisis, as showed in the figure 2 above in section 3. Moreover, such a growth seems to 
be driven mostly by consumption components, which in turn are sustained by the credit. 
This kind of growth is uneven, unstable and more inclined to generate bubble and burst 
cycles. It is far from what the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank define 
“high-quality growth” (HQG). In particular, the IMF defines HQG as “…growth that is 
sustainable brings lasting gains in employment and living standards, reduce poverty and 
inequality (IMF 1995: 286).  
Finally, given the relatively lower percentage of US public expenditure directed 
towards unemployment policies (0.49% of GDP against the 2.8% of GDP countries on 
the Eurozone spent), the human cost of unemployment is much higher in the US than the 
Eurozone (see figure A10 in appendix). All this confirms my argument that the ESM 
(roughly the Eurozone) is better able to cope with this crisis, allowing fewer social costs 
and creating better social performance than see in US. 
Yet the EU faces a major issue, which US does not have, i.e., the Euro situation 
and  the  contradiction  of  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  having  a  common 
monetary policy, without: 1) a central budged, 2) a common fiscal policy and, 3) a de-  25 
facto,  no  labor  mobility  within  the  Eurozone.  Quite  the  opposite,  the  US  dollar,  the 
federal  budget  and  a  labor  mobility  within  US  are  the  main  strengths  of  American 
economy vis à vis the EMU. The European common currency paradoxically, but perhaps 
not surprisingly, has divided the EU between core and periphery. This division could be 
accepted and somehow managed, however it needs to be backed by political decisions 
which introduce wider common fiscal policies and a central budget (a central budget of 
around 1% of EU GDP as today, is unacceptably low). It follows that EU imbalances 
should be treated as an internal issues, managed through Euro-Bonds, ECB policy of 
buying  member  state  Bonds,  and  a  permanent  European  Fund  such  as  the  Financial 
Stability Facility which could contribute to manage EU aggregate demand and could 
work  (if  not  the  ECB)  as  a  lender  of  last  resort.  In  this  sense,  the  Tremonti-Junker 
proposal of issuing European Union Bonds would go in the right direction
26. 
 
5. 3 The return of austerity 
In order to recover from the crisis, governments initially put in place fiscal stimuli 
and bank rescue packages (see table below). These policies were supported by a great 
consensus among the policymakers, politicians, and academics who had begun  to look at 
Keynesian policies in a favourable way. In the US under the Bush administration the 
TARP  (Troubled  Asset  Relief  Program)  Act  was  launched  in  order  to  purchase 
“troubled”  assets  and  equity  from  financial  institutions  and  to  strengthen  trust  in  the 
financial sector.  The Act allowed the Treasury to purchase illiquid, difficult-to-value 
assets  from  banks  and  other  financial  institutions  as  a  first  reaction  to  the  subprime 
mortgage crisis, for a value of 700 US bn $ (or 2.3 of US GDP). This was followed by 
Obama’s fiscal stimulus, known as ARRA (American Recovering and Reinvestment Act) 
which entered onto the scene in February, 2009 for a value of 775 US bn $ (or 2.7 of US 
GDP).  The  stimulus  aims  to  promote,  in  the  Keynesian  tradition,  job  creation, 
investment, and consumer spending during the recession for a value of  (Romer and 
                                                 
26 Jean-Claude Juncker and Giulio Tremonti made a proposal on the Financial Times for a European Union 
bond, issued by a European Debt Agency (EDA).  Each country can issue European bonds up to 40% of 
GDP.  This would create, over time, a sovereign bond market of similar size to the US one.  Initially the 
EDA would finance 50% of member states’ debt issues – but this can be raised to 100% during crises.  The 
proposal also envisions a mechanism to switch between national and European bonds for countries in 
trouble at a discount rate.  This would avoid the problem that secondary markets in many EU sovereign 
bonds are not sufficient liquid during crises.    26 
Bernestein, 2010). In the main EU countries fiscal stimuli were implemented to, for a 
total around 300 US bn $ (or 1.5% of EU GDP) (IMF 2009b). 
The outcomes of these stimuli were quite positive: in the second quarter of 2010, 
Germany grew at an extraordinary rate of 8.8%, and the UK at 4.8%. Similar stories, 
although of less magnitude, occurred in other European economies.  The US recovered, 
too, with 1.6% growth for the same period.  Nevertheless, after the spring of 2010, policy 
consensus  switched  towards  austerity  measures.  After  the  Greek  crisis,  governments 
turned their interests, irrationally, toward budget cuts and policies of contraction (Arestis 
and Pelagidis, 2010). In the fall of 2010, the new Liberal-Conservative government in the 
UK announced an austerity plan with cuts in public expenditures and a freezing of public 
employment wages and jobs for the next three years. A similar plan was announced in the 
US by President Barack Obama in November, 2010, freezing federal pay for the next two 
years. Chancellor Merkel is proposing similar restrictive plans in Germany, and other 
continental  European  countries  are  preparing  financial  laws  very  much  focused  on 
restrictive fiscal measurements. The objective is to reduce deficits. This seems more like 
a reaction to the Greek and Irish crises, rather than a rational decision which would help 
economic recovery (Arestis and Pelagidis, 2010). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the same vein as Kindleberger (2005), we can conclude that if there are manias 
governing financial systems, which are far from rational and efficient, then governments 
should intervene and regulate. Monetary policy could go further to discourage manias by 
implementing a financial transaction tax. Beyond that, however, governments need to do 
something more: guarantee an appropriate level of consumption which could be sustained 
by an appropriate level of wage in order to maintain an appropriate level of aggregate 
demand. Finance, regulated under the supervision of the state, should serve productive 
investments. On the other side, an appropriate level of aggregate demand is guaranteed 
by  a  demand  management  policy  which  relies  on  an  appropriate  level  of  public 
investment. However the most recent austerity policies, both in Europe and the US, go 
just in the opposite direction (Arestis and Pelagidis, 2010)  
Lessons can be drawn, obviously, from Keynes and from the Fordist model of 
production, where finance had a secondary role in the economic system and it was a tool   27 
which  guaranteed  credit  for  firms  and  productive  investments,  while  wage,  which 
guaranteed  consumption,  was  the  main  nexus  around  which  other  institutional  forms 
gravitated.  The Eurozone today looks to be in a slightly better position than the US, as 
the Synthetic Vulnerability Index showed. This is also due to the fact that the institutional 
forms  are  a  bit  more  anchored  to  the  wage  nexus,  unemployment  does  not  increase 
dramatically as in the US during crisis, and finance is not yet the main institutional form, 
although  the  past  twenty  years  in  Europe  have  seen  deregulation  of  finance  and 
liberalization which brought about strong financialization in the economic system and 
greater systemic risk. The Eurozone, and in particular the countries of the ESM, are able 
to  combine,  better  than  the  US,  efficiency  (GDP  growth)  and  social  performance 
(inequality, poverty, mass education and life expectancy). After the WWII the countries 
of the Eurozone grew faster than the US and reached better social conditions.  Only in the 
last two decades has the US had slightly faster GDP growth, with further worsening 
social  indicators.  However,  that  GDP  growth  in  the  US  was  led  by  the  kind  of 
financialization which caused the big crash and the Great recession of 2007-2009.  In this 
light, the US model, led by finance, raises many doubts and should be radically reformed.  
I suggested this has to be done along the lines of the ESM. Despite the fact that GDP 
recession was deeper in the EU than in the US, and GDP recovery seems to be faster in 
the US, social costs are greater than in the EU. As we argued in section 5.2, the US 
recovery  seems  still  be  affected  by  structural  problems  of  income  distribution, 
consumption-driven components and huge compensation in the financial sector. This in 
the end will generate an unstable economic growth which favours again the top decil of 
the income distribution and which is keen to cause bubble and burst cycles.  
Finally, the EU and US efforts toward financial regulation have to be welcomed, 
although they still seems insufficient to bring the whole system to a path of stable and 
sustainable development. In the US, the Frank-Dodd Act is an inferior compromise which 
would need to be improved in order to give real stability to the system and eliminate, or 
simply  reduce,  the  systemic  risk.  Too  many  carve-outs  and  ambiguities  remain,  in 
particular  regarding  the  oversight  role  of  the  Fed  towards  large  firms,  the  almost 
unchanged  regulation  for  Rating  Agencies  and  hedge  funds,  the  objections  against  a 
financial  tax,  and  the  opposition  to  Basel  III.  Though  it  does  seem  interesting  the 
introduction  of  the  Volcker  rule,  which  separates  the  dangerous  coexistence  between   28 
investment  and  commercial  banks  and  limits  banks  in  engaging  proprietary  trading, 
occurred in the US.  
In  Europe,  the  main  difficulties  are  at  the  operational  level  of  the  new  EU 
financial regulatory systems introduced.  Too much fragmentation exists among members 
states,  divisions  between  Eurozone  and  non  Eurozone,  and  most  importantly,  a  very 
different  strategic  position  between  the  French-German  axe  and  the  British.  Such 
strategic differences pose obstacles to the very important questions, such as a financial 
transaction tax, hedge fund regulation, and the introduction of a sort of Volcker rule. Not 
to mention the differences over the general framework of the kind of the socio-economic 
model  required.  Financial  stability,  financial  integration,  and  national  supervisory 
autonomy cannot be achieved simultaneously.  The EU must decide what it wants to 
achieve,  knowing  that  only  two  out  of  those  three  objectives  can  be  achieved 





















Figure A1 – The Mechanism of the Fordist Growth Model  
 
Source: Boyer, 2000  
Figure A2 - GDP Growth in the EU and the US 
 
Source: Eurostat 30
Table A1 - US and Eurozone Comparison on Main Features 
Eurozone 2009  US 2009 
World share of GDP   14.8% (EU27: 21%)  20.2%  
Global market share in terms of exports (world %)  15% (EU27: 20%)  13% 
Population  328 mln: (EU 27: 498mln)  317mln 
Inequality - Gini coefficient  0.29%  41% 
GDP per capita $ ppp  33,452  46,653 
Life expectancy at birth   81  79 
Poverty (50% of median income) 2006  10%  17.1% 
Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (primary, 
secondary & tertiary levels, % of pop) 
                 Secondary enrolment ratio (% of secondary                                           
                  school-age  population) 
                  Primary enrolment ratio (% of primary  
                  school-age  population) 















Source: IMF, 2010 World Economic Outlook (online database), UNDP (HD Report, online database) 
Figure A3 - EU and US Social Expenditures 
 
Source: OECD 2010, Employment Outlook (online database)   31 
Table A2 – Varieties of Capitalism 
Varieties of capitalism within the enlarged European 
Union  (17 Eurozone members, with *) 
Competitive  Market  Economies 
(Anglo-Saxon model) 
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UK   
Ireland* 
 
US, UK, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia 
Note: Norway and Switzerland are not part o the EU but would fit very well in the ESM (Pontusson 2005). 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain  sometimes classified as Mediterranean model with typical characteristics 
of the ESM such as consistent Welfare States and Public expenditure, coupled with inefficiency, debt and 
corruption (which usually are not found in the ESM).Source:adapted from Pontusson (2005),Tridico (2011) 
 
Table A3 – Main Macroeconomic Variables for the US and  Eurozone (EU-16) 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
  US  EU16  US  EU16  US  EU16  US  EU16  US  EU16  US  EU16 




3.0  2.1 
 
2.8  0.3 
 
0.6  -2.6 
 
-4.1  2.5 
 
1  1.5 
 
1.5 
Unemployment (% of 
the labour force) 
4,6 
 
8.3  4,6 
 
7.5  5,81 
 
7.5  10 
 
9.4  9.8 
 
9.6  9.7 
 
9.8 
Inflation (HICP nom. 
change) 
3.2  2.2  2.8 
 
2.1  3.8  3.3 
 
0  0.3 
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Figure A4 – The 2008-09 Recession and Projections 
 
Source: IMF, 2010 World Economic Outlook (online database) 
Figure A6 - US-EU27 Trade Balance 
 
Source: US International Trade Commission, online database, 2010 33
Figure A7 – EU Current Account Balance with Selected Partners 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure A8 – Labour Market Evolution in the Eurozone 
 
Source: Eurostat 34
Figure A9 – Labour Market Evolution in the US 
 
Source: US Bureau of Labour Statistics 
Figure A10 – Public Expenditure on Unemployment, OECD Countries  
 
Source: OECD 2010, Employment outlook (online database)   35 
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